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CAVEAT EMPTOR - WHERE HAVE YOU
GONE?
Albert G. Besser*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Caveat emptor1 no longer governs real estate sales in New
Jersey. It has been replaced, in part, by the law of strict liability. In
a case of first and singular impression, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has extended the doctrine of strict liability 'to permit a current
property owner to recover damages against a remote predecessor in
title flowing from the latter's abnormally dangerous activities.' A
seller cannot escape the consequences of his past activities, not even
by contract, when those activities have, with hindsight, been determined to be ultrahazardous. s This article will show how this result
stands in direct contradiction with the New Jersey Supreme Court's

stated purposes for its decision in T & E.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE

T &E

SITE

At its plant in Orange, New Jersey, the United States Radium
Corporation (hereinafter "U.S. Radium") crushed carnotite ore
from 1915 until 1926, which it imported daily by railroad from Colorado and Utah. U.S. Radium then subjected the ore to a fractional
* Founding partner, Hannoch Weisman. B.A. 1946. Yale University (with highest distinction, Phi Beta Kappa); LL.B. 1949, Yale University School of Law. The author has litigated numerous cases in the criminal and civil areas before the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Besser is also the author of numerous published
articles.' Mr. Besser was counsel for the losing party in T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light
Corp. This article should be read in that context.
I. "Let the buyer beware. The maxim.summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for himself. This maxim is more applicable to judicial sales, auctions
and the like, than to sales of consumer goods where strict liability, warranty, and other consumer protection laws protect the consumer-buyer." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed.
1990).
2. T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991)[hereinafter T & El.
3. T & E, 123 N.J. at 371, 587 A.2d at 1258-59.
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crystallization process which, ultimately, yielded radium 226. Some
the company sold commercially; the rest it retained for its own use in
the manufacture and application of luminous paints with which an
assembly line of female employees painted clocks, watches and other
instruments. Like artists, the employees sharpened their brushes by
licking them.5 Many of them, as well as workers engaged in similar
activities at other plants, contracted what later was diagnosed as leukemia and other forms of cancer. The industry first blamed poor personal hygiene, smoking (a remarkably perceptive "excuse," but off
the mark in these cases), bad diets, and a host of other causes. However, Dr. Harrison S. Martland, the Chief Medical Examiner in Essex County in 1930, ineluctably linked employee Irene La Porte's
death to "occupational radium poisoning (osteogenic-sarcoma of
[the] pelvis) in the watch-dial industry" caused by her ingestion of
radium with each lick of the brush.' Nonetheless, U.S. Radium was
absolved of negligence because "no one had considered the effect of

the radium substances on the workers.

.

.

.

"

Before Martland's

study, "there was neither knowledge of an occupational hazard in
the dial-painting industry nor, in the light of the knowledge concerning radium, reason for the defendant to.believe or to have known of
the hazard." 8
U.S. Radium ceased its operations and vacated the premises in
1926 because of the discovery of a much richer ore in the Belgian
Congo. It leased portions of the plant to commercial tenants in the
mid-1930's and finally sold the property in 1943. Four transfers of
title later, T & E purchased the site in 1973, after having leased it
for four years. U.S. Radium, however, continued to manufacture luminous paints in New York City, but it purchased its radium elsewhere. When the plant was sold in 1943, U.S. Radium's management probably believed it was bidding farewell to Orange, New
Jersey; caveat emptor was, in those days, the rule. Decades later,
however, a new generation of U.S. Radium's management would
4. T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J. Super 228, 546 A.2d 570, modified, 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991)[hereinafter T & E Indus.]. This was an extraction
process which extracted about 80 percent of the radium from the carnotite ore. The by-products of this process were both liquid and solid waste. Id. From the thousands of tons of ore
imported daily, U.S Radium produced 25.6 grams of pure radium during the entire period of
the plant's operation.
5. La Porte v. United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263, 264 (D. N.J. 1935).
6. La Porte, 13 F. Supp. at 265.
7. Id. at 271.
8. Id. at 275.
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learn that the plant's sale was just the beginning.
The crystallization process had been only eighty percent efficient. 9 Twenty percent of the radium that was contained naturally
within the carnotite ore remained in the unusable by-products. The
liquid by-products were flushed down the Orange sewer system. The
solid by-products, commonly referred to as "tailings," were, however,
deposited on vacant portions of the site. They contained an infinitesimally small amount of radium, estimated by T & E's expert at no
more than a grain of sugar in one thousand tons of fill."0
"Uranium 238, first in the radioactive decay chain, contains an
unstable nuclide which results in a series of decays creating other
elements, as the nucleus disintegrates by spontaneous emission of
charged particles." 1 ' In 1600 years, one half of a given mass of radium will disintegrate into radon, a colorless and odorless gas, one
half of which degenerates into bismuth, lead and polonium, in 3.8
days. 2 Radium 226, which the dial painters ingested when they
licked their coated brushes, emits gamma rays which penetrate solid
substances but lose their potency very quickly over distance 3 ; hence,
the leukemia and bone marrow diseases from which the dial painters
died. Radon and its progeny emit ionized alpha particles which attach to walls, ceilings and dust particles and, in a confined atmosphere, are easily aspirated.' Seventy percent of what is inhaled is
exhaled, but the remaining thirty percent of the ionized alpha particles, at least in excessive amounts,' 5 can cause lung cancer.' 6
The tenant who purchased the Orange, New Jersey plant from
U.S. Radium was aware that the fill around the plant was radioactive." Indeed, he sent it out for analysis, not because of health fears,
but, hopefully, to exploit it commercially.' 8 The minute amount of
radium reported still in the soil discouraged the tenant from pursuing the matter.' 9 Needless to say, the lab report did not warn him of
any latent health dangers. Then, in 1943, the plant's new owner, in
9. T & E Indus., 227 N.J. Super. at 228, 546 A.2d at 571.
10. Id.
11. T & E Indus., 227 N.J. Super. at 228, 546 A.2d at 571.
12. M. LAFAVORE, RADON: THE INVISIBLE THREAT 20-22 (1987).
13. Id.
14. T & E Indus., 227 N.J. Super. at 228, 546 A.2d at 517.
15. How much and to what extent spawns the "threshold" versus "non-threshold" debate, discussed infra note 101.
16. M. LAFAVORE, RADON: THE INVISIBLE THREAT 65 (1987).
17. See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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his ignorance about the health risks inherent in the soil, extended the
plant over the discarded tailings." Although he, and subsequent purchasers, did not realize it, the radon from the radium buried beneath
this new section of the plant became concentrated in the plant's
boiler room, instead of dissipating harmlessly into the atmosphere. 1
After three additional transfers of title, T & E leased the site in
1969 and purchased it in 1973. In March of 1979, the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter NJDEP), visited the plant. 2
The NJDEP found that radon levels in the plant, especially in
the assembly and oven rooms which had been built over the discarded tailings, substantially exceeded state regulatory levels for
commercial areas .2 The primary concerns were one or two gamma
radiation "hot spots" in the boiler room where gamma radiation
from the radium itself far exceeded permissible limits prescribed by
state regulations. The discarded tailings outside the plant posed no
problem for the workers: as the radon therefrom dissipated into the
air and the gamma emissions from the radium lost their potency a
few feet from the ground,2 " and the radon dissipated harmlessly into
the atmosphere. Elsewhere, radon levels were below applicable standards, except for two places where the levels were marginally excessive. At one spot in the oven room, the radon measurements exceeded permissible levels for a forty-hour week exposure, but no T &
E worker ever was in the oven room close to that length of time.
The NJDEP monitored the radioactivity in the plant for six
months and in November of 1979, ordered T & E to take interim
remedial action.2 In response to the order from the NJDEP, T & E
restricted employee access to the oven room and monitored the use
of that room. T & E also consulted with a health physicist and com20. T & E Indus., 227 N.J. Super at 228, 546 A.2d at 517.
21. Id.
22. The NJDEP was motivated not by complaints or public concern about the Orange
plant, but, rather, by nationally circulated "alerts" distributed by the federal government concerning the potential dangers involved in discarded radioactive tailings. These alerts followed
the passage of the federal Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act ("UMTRAP"). The
NJDEP searched past history to determine if such discarded piles existed in New Jersey. Finding that U.S. Radium had once operated in Orange, the NJDEP descended on T & E.
23. T & E., 123 N.J. at 380, 587 A.2d at 1253.
24. T & E's expert agreed that several hundred trips a day across the parking lot in a
bent position were required to expose a person to excessive gamma radiation The greatest
danger, he speculated, might come from tomatoes if an enterprising gardener cultivated them
in the radioactive soil. Id.
25. Id. at 381, 587 A.2d at 1253.
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plied with his recommendations. 2 The NJDEP warned T & E that
if the site was not fully decontaminated, T & E might have to consider abandoning the site.
T & E implemented many of the NJDEP's recommended remedial measures, restricted access to the boiler room and, one year
later, advised the NJDEP that these measures "ha[d] significantly
reduced the [radiation] in all areas of the factory.""7 The NJDEP
acknowledged that the levels of radioactivity inside the plant had
been greatly reduced, reporting that "the radon concentrations are
now at levels approximating the residential standard" and that the
gamma radiation in the oven room had been controlled by limiting
access to that area.28
The NJDEP never returned to the site and did not press T & E
to move, apparently content with the remedial measures that had
been taken. No employees quit and to this day there has been no
reported case of cancer due to exposure at the plant. T & E enjoyed
its best years ever in the two years immediately preceding the move
from the site. T & E advised its customers that it was moving to
"new and larger quarters" and that they were greatly expanded in
both size and quality to better serve them. Nonetheless, the New
Jersey Supreme Court found that T & E was "compelled to move"
because of adverse publicity, concerns about workman's compensation claims and customer reaction.29
Both buyer and seller were innocent in T & E. T & E apparently did not know that the discarded tailings were there, but a
proper environmental investigation would have revealed their pres26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D.
N.J. 1988)(discussing the NJDEP's response to the remedial measures).
29. T & E, 123 N.J. at 399, 587 A.2d at 1263. In March of 1981, T & E sued U.S.
Radium and various claimed successors on nuisance, negligence, fraud and strict liability
under an abnormally dangerous, or ultrahazardous, activity causes of action. The nuisance,
negligence and fraud charges fell by the wayside, but the New Jersey Supreme Court, in T &
E, found U.S. Radium strictly liable for all recoverable damages. Much of the discarded fill
was alleged to have found its way to dump sites in three nearby residential communities:
Montclair, Glen Ridge and West Orange. Although there is no paper trail nor testimonial
explanation, the link between the fill on these nearby suburban sites and the West Orange
radium plant has been established geologically. This apparent disposal of radioactive tailings
off-site spawned a related law suit by two hundred and fifty individual plaintiffs who lived in
sixty-one of these homes. These two litigations triggered another action by U.S. Radium and
its co-defendants against numerous primary and excess insurance carriers for coverage. The
off-site plaintiff suit was settled; eight of the carriers have settled, including all five primary
carriers.
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ence.5 ° Extending the Rylands doctrine of strict liability for the consequences of ultrahazardous activity, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held U.S. Radium absolutely liable for the economic consequences
flowing from the polluted soil, thus shifting the loss from the "as is"
purchaser to the party originally, although innocently, responsible
for the toxic pollution.
III.

THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STRICT LIABILITY

[T]he rule of caveat emptor [has been abolished] as to the sale of
new homes by a builder-vendor and, in accordance with a national
trend [and a] theory of implied warranties .... [But we have] no
doubt that where, as here, corporations of roughly equal resources
contract for the sale of an industrial property, and especially where
the dispute [is] over a condition on the land rather than a structure, caveat emptor remains the rule.
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was
that, in the absence of an express agreement, the vendor of land
was not liable to his vendee or a fortiori to any other person, for
the condition of the land existing at the time of transfer. As to
sales of land this rule has retained much of its original force, and
the implied warranties which have grown up around the sale of
chattels never have developed. This is perhaps because great importance always has been attached to the deed of conveyance, which is
taken to represent the full agreement of the parties, and to exclude
all other terms and liabilities. The vendee is required to make his
own inspection of the premises, and the vendor is not responsible to
him for their defective condition, existing at the time of transfer."1
Under T & E, this is no longer the rule in New Jersey. The T
& E court, invoking the doctrine of strict liability for damages resulting from abnormally dangerous activities, held U.S. Radium
strictly liable for all damages suffered by T & E as a result of the
1979 discovery of radioactive fill on its premises. The T & E court
reached this decision even though the danger of such discarded
waste was not perceived until the late 1960's, long after U.S. Radium had sold the property and, indeed, several transfers of title af30. U.S. Radium and its successors were ignorant of the dangers associated with the
abandoned processing by-products although clearly aware of the perils associated with the
handling of or exposure to radium itself, due largely to the lady dial-painters' experiences. See,
supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
31. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc. 762 F.2d 303, 312-13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 980 (1985).
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ter that. 82
Since Rylands, common law jurisdictions have imposed liability
for abnormally dangerous activities which cause damages to another
person or his property, regardless of the fault of the person engaging
in the activity. Until T & E, however, this rule had never been applied for the benefit of a remote successor in title to the premises
where that activity has been conducted. Uniformly, it has operated
solely in favor of off-site neighbors, usually located on adjoining or
distant properties, who, through no fault of their own, have been
damaged by such intrinsically dangerous activities. 3
Restriction of this rule to innocent off-site neighbors is consistent with the rule's original rationale - to protect a freeholder's
"right to possession and quiet enjoyment of his land," free from the
unlawful interference or trespass of others.3 4 As Rylands stressed, a
landowner has a unique responsibility to his neighbors.3 5 This was
the issue which led to New Jersey's formal adoption of the Rylands Restatement strict liability rule.3
In Ventron, a long-departed operator of a mercury processing
plant in the Meadowlands had dumped 268 tons of toxic mercury
effluent into Berry Creek, a tidal estuary of the Hackensack River
that flows through the Meadowlands. 37 Consistent with its traditional application, the court applied the Rylands - Restatement rule
to award damages to an adjacent property owner whose lands had
been affected by the toxic mercury and who had been ordered by the
NJDEP to clean up the mess against the original perpetrator.38 The
court held that:
[w]e believe that it is time to recognize expressly that the law of
liability has evolved so that a landowner is strictly liable to others
for harm caused by toxic wastes that are stored on his property and
flow onto the property of others.89

32. See T & E, 123 N.J. at 377-80, 587 A.2d at 1252-53 (discussing the various studies
conducted by the scientific community involving the epidemiological risks associated with
radon).
33. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
34.

Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866).

35. Id. Certainly this was the concern in that seminal case, where water from a reservoir
broke through an abandoned mine shaft and escaped onto the adjoining land.
36. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150
(1983)[hereinafter Ventron].
37.

Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. 94 N.J. at 488, 468 A.2d at 157 (emphasis added). The vendor was liable to the
vendee, not on strict liability, abnormally dangerous activity grounds, but because of the ven-
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While expressly invoking the Rylands - Restatement rule of

strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity, the court in
Ventron stressed that it was, in reality, giving another name to relief
traditionally employed to "[redress] unlawful interference with a
landowner's right to the possession and quiet enjoyment of his land"
where the more rigid remedies of trespass and nuisance did not fully
compensate the injured party. 40 Thus, the court in Ventron noted
that such strict liability runs from a "land owner ... to others for
harm caused by toxic wastes that . . . flow onto the property of
others."4 1 The Ventron court cited several earlier New Jersey cases4"

for support where, on varying rationale, similar relief had been
granted to an aggrieved neighbor. The neighbors in these cases had
all been damaged by the acts of an adjacent property owner without
regard to the latter's fault.43
As between an innocent neighbor and the one causing the harm,
albeit without negligence, placing liability on the actor is consistent

with the original Rylands thesis. An adjacent property owner has
done nothing, even unwittingly, to contribute to his damage and, historically, has had the absolute right to be protected against unsolicited invasions from abroad.4 4 After all:
[m]atters happening within one's own bounds are one thing and
matters happening outside those bounds are an entirely different
thing. In the latter case, the personal relation is absent and the
occupier's dominion over and right to use his land have to be reconciled with the rights of others to use or be present on adjoining
4
lands not subject to his dominion. 5
A successor in title, however, is-not a mere bystander injured by
dor's fraudulent nondisclosure of material facts. Id. at 503-04, 468 A.2d at 166.
40. Ventron, 94 N.J. at 488-89, 468 A.2d at 157.
41. Id. (emphasis added). The court held that "[plollution from toxic waste that seeps
onto the land of others and into streams necessarily harms the environment." Id.
42. The court noted that, twenty-one years earlier, in Berg v. Reaction Motors Div.,
Thiokol Chemical Corp., 37 N.J. 396 (1962), without reference to the Rylands rule, the New
Jersey Supreme Court had held that "an ultrahazardous activity which introduces an unusual
danger into the community ... should pay its own way in the event it actually causes damage
to others," resulting in a judgment for adjacent residential property owners. Id. The adjacent
owners had been injured by the defendant's testing of a rocket engine. This rule of "fairness"
was applicable to "neighboring properties" and "wholly innocent neighbors." Id. at 410. All of
the earlier cases which the court in Berg cited to support its holding involved injury to off-site
plaintiffs.
43. Id.
44. See Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866).
45. Read v. Lyons & Co., (1947).

19921

CAVEAT EMPTOR

circumstances which he did not set in motion. First, in T & E's case,
the successor in title purchased the very site about which he now
complains, a coincidental but, nonetheless, voluntary action, distinguishing it from the off-site neighbor who was not involved with the
property owner on whose land the abnormally dangerous activity was
taking place. The purchaser can and, in this environmentally conscious era, should inspect the property or subject it to an environmental investigation. The purchaser can scrutinize the -property's title search with an eye to clues concerning past activities which bear
further investigation. Even the Restatement's codification of the rule
suggests that it runs only in favor of "another" who is harmed by the
abnormally dangerous activity. Comment d to the Restatement explains that strict liability "arises out of the ... risk that it creates, of
harm to those in the vicinity."' 6 This view is founded on the policy
of the law that imposes upon anyone who, for his own purposes, creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors the responsibility of
relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur. 7
In other jurisdictions, the cause of action has been uniformly
confined to off-site neighbors, starting with England, where the Rylands doctrine first arose. Thus, in one English case, the Chief Judge
wrote that strict liability "is conditioned by . . . 'escape' from the
land of something likely to do mischief if it escapes . . . ."'" The
several concurring opinions in Read all stressed that "escape" to the
lands of another was the underpinning for the strict liability rule. 9
Commentators, who before T & E had uniformly opined that the
rule was restricted to "escaping" activities damaging a neighbor, will
have to change their thesis or, at least, acknowledge T & E with a
footnote."0
T & E purchased the U.S. Radium site in 1974, after leasing it
for four years. 1 Through its title search, T & E knew that U.S.
Radium had once occupied the property, a fact that had prompted
46.
47.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, comment d.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977)(emphasis added).

48. Read v. Lyons & Co., App. Cas. 156 (1947).
49. For cases restricting the rule to aggrieved neighbors, see E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 860 (10th Cir. 1949); Worley Constr. Co. v. Hungerford, 215 Va.
377, 210 S.E.2d 161, 164-65 (1974); McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324,
467 P.2d 635, 639 (1970); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (1948); Barrette v. Franki Compressed Pile Co., 2 Dom. L. Rep. 655, 675 (1955).
50. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 548 (1984); HARPER,
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY. THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.5, at 220 (2d ed. 1986); Note, Escape of GasAbsolute Liability, 54 A.L.R.2d 764 (1957).
51. T & E, 123 N.J. at 379, 587 A.2d at 1253.
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the NJDEP to investigate the site in 1979.52 As the New Jersey Su-

preme Court acknowledged, there is no way a seller can contractually immunize itself against claims from subsequent buyers when an
activity is perceived with hindsight to be abnormally dangerous.53

However, "[a purchaser] has a right to protect himself by contract
. . .while a person who owns or occupies adjoining land does not

enjoy this right. '"54 In short, the buyer is afforded ample means by
which to protect himself such as by investigation, indemnification
from the seller or, in the last analysis, by declining to purchase the
premises. T & E availed itself of none of these opportunities, choosing instead to purchase the property "as is."
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected these distinctions for
policy reasons calculated to "internalize" the cost of an ultrahazardous business.5 5 The court rationalized its decision by citing
recent examples where purchasers were entitled to recover from sellers who had failed to disclose a condition involving unreasonable risk
to others56 and by citing product liability cases.57 However, these
cases involved no startling deviation from past precedent; they simply allowed the ultimate consumer to recover damages for breach of
implied warranty or merchantability despite lack of privity with the
manufacturer. 58 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held, for exam52. Id. Articles printed in 1932 in the American Journal of Cancer and in 1941 in a
handbook published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, reporting that inhaling radon may
cause carcinoma of the lungs, created a national warning of the dangers associated with discarded radioactive fill. Id. at 378, 587 A.2d at 1253. Accordingly, the NJDEP tested T & E's
plant for radon and gamma radiation and concluded that the plant posed a "significant potential threat to human health because of [its] known ... toxicity." Id. at 380, 587 A.2d at 1254.
53. T & E, 123 N.J. at 401, 587 A.2d at 1264.
54. M.W. Worley Constr. Co., 215 Va. at 380, 210 S.E.2d at 164.
55. Ultrahazardous businesses can internalize "the unusual risk by passing it on to the
public" as a valid business expense. T & E, 123 N.J. at 387, 587 A.2d at 1257 (quoting
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 50 at 537).
56. T & E, 123 N.J. at 387-88, 587 A.2d at 1257-58.
57. , See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960)(purchase of a defective automobile); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965)(recovery of costs for defective rug).
58. Cf. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946)(defective wire rope);
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958)(defective cinder blocks); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 11
N.E.2d 421 (1953)(inflammable cowboy suit); Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46 Ohio Op.
161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (195 1)(defective emery wheel); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages,
46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951)(exploding bottle). For food and drug cases where
lack of privity has not been allowed to interfere with recovery, see, e.g., Patargias v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 332 I1. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill.
App. 273, 50
N.E.2d 855 (1943); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill.
App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943).
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ple, that "we would not countenance a doctrine of 'buyer beware' in
the context of fraudulent concealment of infestation of property.""
In Weintraub, the seller of a residential home knew that the property
was infested by cockroaches, but remained silent.6" U.S. Radium
had no idea that there was a threat inherent in the discarded tailings; no one did in 1915-1925. 61
In Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit has held that a property
owner could not recover cleanup costs and other damages from toxic
waste contamination for which its predecessors in title had been responsible.62 On appeal, the plaintiff urged that the rationale should
be extended to indemnify it against damages due to the former landowner's abnormally dangerous activities." Applying Pennsylvania
law, the Third Circuit held that:
[t]he parties have cited no case from Pennsylvania or any other
jurisdiction, and we have found none, that permits a purchaser of
real property to recover from the seller on a private nuisance theory for conditions existing on the very land transferred, and
thereby to circumvent limitations on vendor liability inherent in the
rule of caveat emptor.6"

Private nuisance liability for invading another's right to use and
enjoy their own land is a "means of efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses."" Accordingly, the
rule under caveat emptor was that the vendor of land was not liable
to the vendee or to any other person, absent an express agreement,
for the condition of the land to be transferred at the time of the
transfer. 66
The New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Philadelphia Electric on the grounds that Pennsylvania, unlike New
Jersey, has more rigorously "premised the erosion of the doctrine of
caveat emptor in the sale of realty solely on the inequality of bar59. T & E, 123 N.J. at 400, 587 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64
N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974)).
60. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. at 445, 317 A.2d at 74.
61. Id. at 319.
62. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 980 (1985).

63. Id. at 316.
64. Id. at 313 (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 312 (quoting Reporter's Note to
(1965)).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 352
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gaining power between the buyer and builder-seller. '6 7 The court
noted, however, that New Jersey stresses the desideratum of placing
liability on the party responsible for the condition, thus encouraging
more careful and thorough practices. 8 For the policy reasons previously noted, however, it appears as though the T & E court simply
opted to reject the result reached in PhiladelphiaElectric. 9 Several
other jurisdictions have followed the Third Circuit's decision in Philadelphia Electric and Florida has expressly rejected the T & E
70
result.
For example, in Massachusetts, Mobil Oil had released oil and
other hazardous substances onto the premises of a gas station which
it had operated from 1926 to 1987.71 Applying Massachusetts law,
the court dismissed the purchaser's nuisance claim against Mobil
because:
[t[he law of private nuisance has historically involved conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses . . . .[A] private
nuisance claim is actionable when a property owner creates, permits, or maintains a condition or activity on his property that
causes a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and
72
enjoyment of the property of another.
In Florida, Futura Realty expressly rejected the T & E holding.
In that case, the current owners sued their vendor as well as a former owner for damage on their property due to the prior use of certain ultrahazardous chemicals.7 Rylands had long been followed by
the Florida courts74 , but the court in Futura Realty declined to expand the Rylands holding to include "remote owners and the users
of the land and [declined] to extend the cause of action from a claim
available to neighbors to a claim available to subsequent owners of
67. T & E, 123 N.J. at 389, 587 A.2d at 1258.
68. Id.
69. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).
70. See, e.g., Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Centers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(a previous owner is not strictly liable to a subsequent purchaser of property because the latter could take measures to protect himself unlike an injured adjoining
landowner).
71. Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1990).
72. Id. at 98 (quoting Asiala v. City of Fitchburg, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 13, 17, 505
N.E.2d 575, 577 (1987)).
73. id. at 364.
74. See, e.g., Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley, 25 Fla. 381, 5 So. 593 (1889); Great Lakes
Dredging & Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1984); Bunyak v.
Yancy & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1983), reh'g denied, 447 So. 2d 885 (1984);
Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1975).
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the property."7 That court held that:
[t[he commercial property vendor owes no duty for damage to the
land to its vendee because the vendee can protect itself in a number
of ways, including careful inspection and price negotiation. this is
the vital legal and practical distinction between the duty owed a
neighbor and the duty owed
a successor in title which T & E In76
dustries failed to identify.

IV.

T & E CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL AND STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION

T & E rejected the concern that "holding a predecessor in title
strictly liable for its abnormally-dangerous activities would destroy
the real estate market, 7 because "a buyer can assume the risk of
harm from . . . [such] . . . activity. ' 78 Other courts disagree. In
Texas, the federal district court declared, in a slightly different context, that "in real estate transactions there would be chaos if vendors, after conveying ownership and control of the premises, could
not delineate either the termination or limitation of their liability. ' 79
Moreover, in Philadelphia Electric, the Third Circuit cautioned
that:
[w]here, as here, the rule of caveat emptor applies, allowing a vendee a cause of action for private nuisance for conditions existing on
the land transferred - where there has been no fraudulent concealment - would in effect negate the market's allocations of resources and risks, and subject vendors who may have originally sold
their land at appropriately discounted prices to unbargained-for liability to remote vendees.80
Such determinations are better left to legislatures, particularly
in areas such as "environmental pollution, where Congress and the
state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve a socially acceptable
75. See Futura Realty, 578 So. 2d at 363.
76. Id.
77. T & E, 123 N.J. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1258 (quoting the defendant's argument).
78. T & E, 123 N.J. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1258. However, the assumption of risk must be
very specific. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, an "as is" contract does not amount to
a waiver of claims or indemnification of the seller against unknown hazards. T & E, 123 N.J.
at 390, 587 A.2d at 1259. Moreover, if the risks are unknown, as was the case when U.S.
Radium sold the plant, the parties, realistically, cannot negotiate the issue of who must bear or
pay for those risks.
79. Graham v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Texas 1977).
.80. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 313 (emphasis added).
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definition of rights and liabilities." 81 For example, the federal Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility Compensation and Liability Act8 2 has imposed strict liability on all parties responsible for the
creation, depositing or disposition of hazardous substances for necessary remedial and removal action.8 3 CERCLA also provides that a
private party may commence a cost recovery action against those
responsible for necessary costs of response consistent with the national contingency plan.8 4 Companion state legislation provides simi85
lar relief.
Significantly, in Wellesley Hills Realty Trust, the federal district court in Massachusetts struck down a successor owner's common law nuisance claim against the original owner for hazardous
substances that were later found on the land. 6 In doing so, the court
specifically recognized the successor owner's statutory claims against
the same defendant under the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous
Material Release Prevention and Response Act,8 7 the Massachusetts
equivalent of CERCLA. Furthermore, the Third Circuit has been
careful to distinguish a property owner's claim against a vendor
under CERCLA for clean-up costs from its holding in Philadelphia
Electric.8 8 Reversing a district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
CERCLA claim on caveat emptor grounds, the Third Circuit distinguished Philadelphia Electric based on the vendor's common law
claims which caveat emptor does not apply against a statutory remedy for strict liability.8 9
Legislative relief to T & E-type plaintiffs, while generous, is
still far more limited than the open-ended damages which T & E
implicitly invites, assessed solely against the one responsible, albeit
innocently, for the pollution. First, all responsible parties must share
81.
82.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991)[hereinafter "CERCLA"].

83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
84. Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(B).
85. See, e.g., New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J.

§§

STAT. ANN.

13:IK-6 to 13:1K-14 (West 1991)[hereinafter "ECRA"]. Two months before the T & E

case was decided, the same court held that, under ECRA, a purchaser could sue his vendor for
damages stemming from the latter's failure to comply with its statutory cleanup responsibilities before transfer. Dixon Venture v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 122 N.J. 228, 584 A.2d 797
(1991). Since this is a statutory cause of action and not a contractual one, it would, presumably, operate against all prior owners, as is the case under CERCLA.
86.

Wellesley Hills Realty Trust, 747 F. Supp. at 93.

87. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E (West Supp. 1991).
88. Smith Land &.Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
89.

Id. at 89-90.
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fairly in such costs under CERCLA.' 0 T & E was one such responsible party as an owner of a facility on which hazardous substances
were found.' 1 Any allocation to a party such as T & E, who purchased the property without actual knowledge of the hazardous substances and did not contribute thereto, would consider these facts.
On the other hand, the fact that a purchase was made "as is," such
as T & E's, without conducting an environmental investigation
would also be considered and might militate against the purchaser in
any CERCLA apportionment of costs or any attempt to invoke the
"innocent purchaser" defense under CERCLA and would, thus, allocate costs in a more equitable way.' 2
Moreover, damages under CERCLA and mirror-like state legislation are more restrictive than damages that appear to be available
under the T & E extension of the Rylands strict liability rule. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, under T & E, would recognize, among
other items, business interruption expenses, moving costs associated
with any relocation without requiring the plaintiff to prove the need
to move, and other unspecified "general and specific damages flowing
from defendant's liability."' 3 None of these damages would have
been allowed in the companion action under CERCLA, which T &
E belatedly brought against the same defendants in its state court
litigation which resulted in the dismissal of its case.' 4 Under CERCLA, only response costs consistent with the National Contingency
Plan, intended for short-term and remedial expenses or those associated with long-term or permanent remedies, are recoverable. 95 The
federal district court rejected T & E's evacuation and relocation expenses, which totaled over $1,000,000, because, under CERCLA, the
President had not determined that such relocation was more cost effective and environmentally preferable or were not categorized by
90. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1). "In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as ... are appropriate."
Id. Without statutory authority the court in Dixon Venture achieved the same result by tailoring the damages remedy to the circumstances.
91. See generally, T & E, 123 N.J. at 377, 587 A.2d at 1252; 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(1).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(i). See, e.g., In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94
Bankr. 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988).
93. T & E, 123 N.J. at 396, 587 A.2d at 1261-62. The case was actually remanded for
the retrial of these issues. T & E, 123 N.J. at 400, 587 A.2d at 1264.
94. Id.
95. T & E Indus. Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 706-07 (D.N.J. 1988).
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the President as reimbursable response costs. 96 Litigation
costs and
97

attorneys fees similarly were summarily dismissed.
V.

THE

T & E

OBJECTIVES OF INDUCING THE ENTREPRENEUR TO

ADOPT ALL POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS AND INSURE AGAINST RISK

CANNOT BE ACHIEVED IF THAT RISK IS UNKNOWN

The rule of absolute liability is a social and economic judgment
such that the one conducting the abnormally dangerous activity
should bear the economic consequences therefrom."' As between the
responsible party and an entirely innocent neighbor, "considerations
of reasonableness, fairness, and morality rather than .. .formulary
labels" dictate this result.9 9 As the Restatement notes, "let the enterprise ... pay its way" by building into the charges for its goods and
services the cost of insuring against such consequences. 10

This social and economic rationale for the strict liability rule
does not, however, apply with equal logic when the actor is aware of
the potential risk and, therefore, cannot insure against such consequences. Unless the entrepreneur is aware of, or should have been
aware of, the potentially ultrahazardous character of the challenged
activity, he is in no position to avoid the future consequences of that
activity. The entrepreneur will never know to adopt more careful
practices or make the cost-benefit analysis and risk-spreading pricing
adjustments the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested were the calculated objectives of the strict liability rule. The policy predicate,
according to T & E, for imposing strict liability on those engaged in
ultrahazardous activities necessarily requires actual or, at least, constructive knowledge of the potential risk of harm at the time the
96. Id. at 707. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24)(statutory requirement under CERCLA).
Compare this conclusion with the New Jersey Supreme Court's finding that T & E's move was
compelled by the radioactive pollution. T & E, 123 N.J. at 371, 587 A.2d at 1249.
97. Id. at 707-08. On the other hand, the federal court held out some hope that T & E
might recover reimbursement for the time spent by its president on the radiation situation. T
& E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 706-07. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this claim, as
not representing a "corporate loss." T & E's president was paid a salary for handling all the
"numerous problems that face a company each day." This included not only the routine but
the extraordinary problems, as well. T & E, 123 N.J. at 399-400, 587 A.2d at 1263-64.
98. An abnormally dangerous activity involves (a) a high degree of risk of harm to
others, (b) the likelihood that such harm will be great but (c) cannot be eliminated by reasonable care, (d) is unusual and (e) inappropriate where conducted and, finally, (f) its value to the
community is perceived as being far outweighed by the inherent risks that the one responsible
for such activity should bear the loss. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
99. Berg, 137 N.J. at 405, 181 A.2d at 492.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment d (1977); see Berg, 137 N.J. at
410, 181 A.2d at 487; PROSSER & KEETON supra note 50 at 555.
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entrepreneur is engaged in such activity. Subsequently acquired
knowledge of the risk comes too late to achieve these objectives. 10 1
"It is clear . . .that unless a statute requires it, strict liability
will never be found unless the defendant is aware of the abnormally
dangerous activity, and has voluntarily engaged in or permitted
it." 0 2 Most of the commentaries discussed by T & E with respect to
this issue have recognized, at least impliedly, that some inquiry into
0 4 clearly
the actor's state of mind is relevant.' 08 The Restatement"
suggests that knowledge or constructive knowledge of the potential
risk, at the time, is necessary before the actor can be held strictly
accountable for damage flowing from his ultrahazardous activities.1 0 5
Thus, section 519(2) limits liability "to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous."108 The
Restatement further explicates that the general principal of absolute
liability "applies only to the harm that is within the scope of the
101. Earlier the New Jersey Supreme Court had noted the "spirited debate between the
experts over the health risks from radiation exposure." This no-threshold opinion statistically
extrapolates valid data from occurrences of extremely high radiation, such as the gamma fallout from the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan and the abnormally high radon concentrations in the close quarters of uranium mines in the United States, Canada and Europe. The
same rate of increased cancers observed in these scientifically valid studies is applied to very
low doses of radiation for which there are no studies. In its simplest form (and there are many
variations), the linear no-threshold theory assumes that if 100 extra units of radiation cause
100 extra cases of cancer for each 100,000 persons, then one extra unit of radiation will cause
one extra case of cancer for the same group. Id. Empirically, however, as the uncontested trial
proofs demonstrated, there are no data to prove the no-threshold hypothesis. As a result, T &
E's expert could only surmise that, as the amount of radiation exposure increases, health risks
also increase. He agreed that no empirical data or government agency supports this thesis.
Nonetheless, the T & E court accepted with no further discussion, that the discarded fill,
in fact, posed a danger to health which caused T & E to "vacate the premises." T & E, 123
N.J. at 381-82, 395, 587 A.2d at 1254-55, 1261. Yet, several federal cases have rejected the
type of proof offered in T & E to demonstrate a cognizable link between toxic pollution and a
threat to health. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace, 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass.
1986)(holding, in a toxic tort case, that "recovery depends on establishing a 'reasonable
probability' that the [future illness] will occur"); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litg., 597
F. Supp. 740, 782 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(holding that while plaintiffs suffered from various
debilitating diseases, they could not prove the link between them and exposure to "small quantities" of toxin). At best, the plaintiffs in the "Agent Orange" case could offer the same nothreshold theory expounded in T & E. The T & E hypothesis that low amounts of increased
toxic pollution pose a risk to health has been rejected by several courts. See, e.g., Johnston v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
102. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 79 (5th ed. 1984)(emphasis added).
103. See T & E, 123 N.J. at 391-92, 587 A.2d at 1260.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 520 (emphasis added).
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abnormal risk.' 1 0 7 As in Rylands, the "existence of a high degree of

risk of some harm" and "likelihood that the harm that results from
it will be great" are relevant factors in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.'0 8 Implicit in the terms "possibility,"
"likelihood" and "scope" is the concept that all must be measured as
of the time of the activity. Otherwise, one cannot evaluate the "possibilities" of harm occurring.
In the Tenth Circuit, a plaintiff brought an action for the recovery of damages caused by a flood from waters allegedly stored by the
defendant in the tunnels and shafts of its mining property.' 0 9 In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court held:
[tihe essence of the rule of liability without fault is that if a person
in the conduct or maintenance of an enterprise which is lawful and
proper in itself deliberately does an act under known conditions
and with knowledge that an injury will in all probability result to
another and injury is sustained by the other as a direct and proximate consequence of the act, the person doing the act and causing
the injury is liable in damages even though he acted without negligence. Under the doctrine, liability rests not upon negligence but
upon the intentional doing of that which the person knows or
should in the exercise of reasonablecare know may in the normal
course of events reasonably cause loss to another. Liability is automatically imposed ... even though there was no negligence."10

The New Jersey Supreme Court has forged new law in a related
area by imposing liability on manufacturers of defective products."'
Manufacturers can be held liable for defective products which are
injected into the stream of commerce for use by the consuming public, despite the public's lack of privity with the manufacturer and the
absence of specific warranties. 1 2 Even those cases, however, recognize that the contemporaneous state of the art is a relevant inquiry.
Such evidence "may support a judgment for a defendant." '" 3 The
107.
108.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment e (1977)(emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a), (b)(1977)(emphasis added).

109. Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171 (10th
Cir. 1953).
110. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Murray v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 209 N.J. Super. 163, 507 A.2d 247 (1986); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985); Gentile v. MacGregor Mfg. Co., 201
N.J. Super. 612, 493 A.2d 647 (1985).
112. Id.
113. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983)(superseded
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New Jersey Supreme Court has held that, when a tetracycline manufacturer failed to warn of a side effect, even if a product's utility
outweighs its risk, the manufacturer must "produce . . . a product
that is reasonably fit, suitable, and safe" for him to escape strict
liability."' However, the product need only be as safe as it could
have been, given the prevailing state-of-the-art. 15 "[G]enerally, conduct should be measured by knowledge [constructive or actual] at
the time the manufacturer distributed the product."" 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court in T & E conceded that this
"state of the art" argument was "interesting," albeit unnecessary to
decide.11 7 T & E rejected the defendant's "narrow" view of the
"knowledge inquiry," which focused on the industry's knowledge,
during 1915-1926, of the "dangers inherent in the discarded tailings,
not simply of those associated with the processing and handling of
radium."1 1 8 In the court's view, U.S. Radium should have known of
the risks inherent in the tailings because of the ultrahazardous nature of radium and the experiences of the dial painters and other
similar noted occurrences.1 1 9 For example, one laboratory worker
had learned very early that she could not touch radium and that she
should wear protective clothing when she was working with the radium.1 0 Another worker "knew enough about the health hazards of
radium to keep away from it as much as possible." 21 The company's
president even "hacked off" his fingertip when radium lodged beneath a nail. 22
Based on this background, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
incredulous that, "[d]espite the wealth of knowledge concerning the
in part by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58c-3a(2)). The new New Jersey statute combines the "consumer expectations" doctrine for determining whether a product is defective with the "obvious
danger" factor of the "risk utility" analysis. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58c-3a(2)). Prior to the
statute's enactment, the "risk utility" analysis was applicable when a plaintiff was unable to
establish a defect under the "consumer expectations" test. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
114. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
115. Id. at 450, 479 A.2d at 385; Cf Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 248 N.J. Super.
540, 553, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (1991)("although state of the art might be dispositive on the
facts of a particular case, it does not constitute an absolute defense apart from its appearance
as one of the components of balancing risk and utility factors.").
116. Id. at 452, 479 A.2d at 385-86 (emphasis added).
117. T & E Indus., 127 N.J. at 391-92, 587 A.2d at 1260.
118. Id. at 392, 587 A.2d at 1260.
119. Id. at 393-94, 587 A.2d at 1260-61.
120. Id. at 377, 587 A.2d at 1252.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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harmful effects of radiation exposure," the defendant in T & E could
contend that it could not have known that the disposal of the radium-saturated by-products behind the plant would produce a hazard. 1 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that "[t]hat contention
appears to rest on the idea that somehow the radium's potential for
harm miraculously disappeared once the material had been deposited
in a vacant corner of an urban lot, or at least that one might reasonably reach that conclusion - a proposition that we do not accept." 2 However, the anecdotal incidents, noted above, which impressed New Jersey's Supreme Court1 25 do not demonstrate that
U.S. Radium recognized or should have even perceived the dangerous nature of the tailings and guard against it or charge for the risk.
Despite the New Jersey Supreme Court's skepticism, and as simple
as the proposition now seems, when radium was processed in this
country, no one was that perceptive of the now recognized dangers
and risks associated with discarded radioactive tailings. The recognized dangers and incidents had always been associated with physical proximity to radium but not the tailings, at the point of manufacture or application. 12 6 Madame Curie died from the indiscriminate
handling of radioactive substances. 2 7 The U.S. Department of Commerce handbook on the subject, published by a committee on which
a U.S. Radium officer had served, was, by its very title "Safe Handling of Radioactive Luminous Compound," concerned with the
proper handling of the luminous paint used in the laboratory and
plant. 2 8 The handbook's text dealt solely with the proper handling
of the compound in the assembly room and plant.' 2 ' The handbook
made no reference to what was considered to be the proper disposition of the discarded tailings. When U.S. Radium's president during
World War II had sought to justify a price increase for its products
by citing the risks associated with its operations, he stressed to the
War Department only the dangers inherent in the exposure of workers in the plant to radium and radon. 3 0 U.S. Radium did not point
out to future purchasers the risks inherent in the by-products buried
123. Id. at 394-95, 587 A.2d at 1261.
124. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
126. See supra text accompanying note 122.
127. 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 371, 373 (15th ed. 1974).
128. The New Jersey Supreme Court in T & E found this handbook and its text to be
"significant." T & E, 123 N.J. at 378, 587 A.2d at 1253.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
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in U.S. Radium's backyard because it was unaware of them.131
Robly Evans, T & E's expert, whom the New Jersey Supreme
Court acknowledged as a contemporaneous expert in the field of radiation in the 1940's,"'a told U.S. Radium's expert that, at the time
the Commerce Department's handbook was published, neither he nor
anyone else had the slightest foreboding about such tailings; a lack

of prescience for which he simply had no explanation. Even, T & E's
trial expert acknowledged that processing facilities throughout the
country disposed of their tailings in at least as unconcernedly a manner as the defendant, U.S. Radium, allegedly did.

At the time, it was standard industry practice not only for the
radium processing industry but for other generators of radioactive
waste to discard that waste without regard to any future potential
danger. 3 3 New Jersey regulators have only begun to recognize and,
subsequently deal with, the effects of these discarded tailings. The

NJDEP, in its "Environmental Investigation of a Former Radium
Site," 34 acknowledged that the problem of sites where radioactive
minerals were mined and radium processed has been only recently
explored. 3 5 Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act of 1978136 as a result of high levels of radiation, discovered accidentally during the mid-1960's, inside residential properties

in Grand Junction, Colorado. 3 7 Uranium tailings from nearby
mines, which were extensively excavated during World War II to
fuel the Manhattan Project, 3 8 were simply dumped on the ground,
available for free fill and for the manufacture of cement blocks during the post-World War II housing boom. 3 9 As the House Committee Report, which antedated the adoption on UMTRAP, noted:
131. T & E, 123 N.J. at 379, 587 A.2d at 1253. Note, however, that the court does not
speak to U.S. Radium's lack of knowledge concerning danger to the general public.
132. T & E, 123 N.J. at 378, 587 A.2d at 1253.
133. For example, the Manhattan Project during World War 11 spawned 35 radioactive
dumps throughout the country, containing abandoned radioactive fill thousands of times more
potent than that at plaintiff's site. See H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7433.
134. This dealt specifically with the T & E site.
135. Environmental Investigation of a Former Radium Site, New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (19-.)(stating that the radiological impact of wastes from industries which extract radioactive elements has been of recent concern to federal and state radiation agencies).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7942 (West 1983)[hereinafter "UMTRAP"1.
137. H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7433.
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 11, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7433, 7454.
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[firom the early 1940's through the early 1970's there was little
official recognition of the hazards presented by these tailings. Federal regulation of the industry was minimal. As a consequence, mill
tailings were left at sites, mostly in the Southwest, in an unstabilized and unprotected condition. Some of these tailings were
used for construction purposes in the foundations and walls of private and public buildings. There, through the concentrated emission of radon gas, the hazard
of the tailings and public exposure
40
increased substantially.1
Following extensive investigation and recommendations promulgated by the United States Surgeon General, 14 1 UMTRAP was formally passed, prescribing regulations for the handling and disposition of such tailings in 1978.
Because of the history recounted above, the trial jury absolved
U.S. Radium of any negligence associated with the sale of its property in 1943 and its failure to warn the purchaser about the dangerous nature of the tailings. 2 Yet, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
with remarkable hindsight, held that "defendant [U.S. Radium]
should have known about the risks of its activity" and that this constructive knowledge satisfied any possible requirement of knowledge
of the risks involved with the tailings "in the context of a strict liability claim predicated on an abnormally dangerous activity." 143
It is unsettling to contemplate that a court, applying a "state of
the art" analysis to determine the existence of an abnormally dangerous activity will apply more rigorous "hindsight" scrutiny to an
entrepreneur's activities than the reasonable man standard of simple
negligence. In concluding that U.S. Radium had at least constructive
knowledge of the dangers inherent in the discarded tailings, and articulating its incredulities that anyone could possibly think otherwise,
140. Id.
141. See Use of Uranium Mill Tailingsfor ConstructionPurposes, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Raw Materials of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong., Ist

Sess. 49 (1971)(report and testimony of Dr. Jesse Steinfeld, Surgeon General of the United
States); Uranium Control Act, 1978: Hearings on 42 U.S.C. § 7901 Before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
142. The trial judge reluctantly let the challenged negligence of U.S. Radium, in failing
to warn T & E of such dangers in 1974, go to the jury, but then set this verdict aside on the
ground that caveat emptor barred such recovery. The issue should never have been submitted
to the jury. U.S. Radium had long since quit the radium processing business. There was, therefore, no basis for intimating and no proof offered to suggest that, in 1974, barely two years
after the Surgeon General issued his first warnings about the safe handling of radioactive
tailings, that U.S. Radium was so informed or should have been so informed.
143. T & E, 123 N.J. at 393, 587 A.2d at 1260.
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the New Jersey Supreme Court has effectively undercut its professed
rationale for imposing strict liability. In order to achieve the risksaving and more careful manufacturing practices T & E professes to
promote, the entrepreneur cannot be held to any degree of knowledge broader than that which exists at the time he is engaged in the
questioned activity. Surely he cannot take care to guard or insure
against that risk of which he is ignorant.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the era of Judges Weintraub, Hughes and Wilentz, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has been at the cutting edge of molding common law tort concepts or fashioning new ones in order to effectuate
the socio-economic policy of (1) protecting the completely innocent
consumer or purchaser from unexpected loss; (2) holding purveyors
of goods and services strictly accountable for their implied warranty
that the goods are free from and fit for the purposes intended and
the services properly rendered; and (3) adopting a "risk-reward"
formula which inevitably thrusts upon manufacturers and distributors the ultimate economic responsibility for their products.
Against this background, the T & E.result was, perhaps, foreordained. 1 However, use of the ancient Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine
to thrust all of the consequences of toxic pollution on the party innocently responsible was not required to equitably apportion the resulting economic loss. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
clearly uneasy with the implications of its decision. In an extraordinary caveat, "born of the occasional experience of having our opinions overruled," the court took pains to distinguish U.S. Radium
from "the operators of a small general store who, in the 1940's, may
have sunk a gas tank on their property." 145 The court conceded that,
in the T & E case, it had made a "qualitative judgment about the
way such an actor would expect the societal risks posed by [its] conduct to be borne." '4 6 But why should the innocent general store operator who sank a gas tank onto his property in the 1940's be exonerated or less likely to expect "the societal risks posed by that
conduct to be borne" by him rather than U.S. Radium who, in an
144. The trial judge correctly predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold
the strict liability doctrine applicable to successors in title, although he did not, personally,
agree with this result. 123 N.J. Super. 228, 546 A.2d 570, 574.
145. 123 N.J. at 400-01, 587 A.2d at 1264.
146. Id.
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even earlier era, had no cause to apprehend such liability? " 7 The
only distinction would seem to'be the "bigness" of the T & E de-

fendants as compared to the "small" general store proprietor.
Federal legislation, such as CERCLA, and its state counterparts, provide a much fairer apportionment of loss amongst all par-

ties commensurate with their respective responsibilities for toxic pollution, particularly as between parties who are all related to the site
where the activities occurred. " 8 In such allocations, the courts can
balance all of the equities such as (1) did successor owners contribute to the condition, (2) could they have protected themselves, (3)
how long did they occupy the affected sites, and (4) what have they
done to alleviate the risk involved?
The New Jersey Supreme Court's seemingly "black and white"
approach confronts sellers of real estate with a no-win dilemma. The
buyer may protect himself through the use of the appropriate investigation, price negotiation and indemnifications, or alternatively, by
purchasing another site. The seller, however, who can contract away

CERCLA liability'

9

can never immunize himself from his common

law strict liability under T & E. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
conceded, an indemnity or release by the buyer is not a definite bar
against subsequent successors in title like T & E who, someday with
hindsight, discover that their property was damaged by the former's
abnormally dangerous operations. 150 Moreover, a general release or
147. Id.
148. On the other hand, strict liability in the classic Rylands sense does suggest a remedy for neighbors who may not have staiutory causes of action against the entrepreneur whose
abnormally dangerous activities have caused them harm. The off-site, "innocent" plaintiffs, on
whose property tailings had allegedly been deposited in some unknown fashion from the old
U.S. Radium plant, have no CERCLA cause of action. They cannot prove that U.S. Radium
or its successors by "contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal" of the tailings onto their properties. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3). They are, however, "neighbors," in whose favor the Rylands doctrine
classically operates.
149. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1); see also Mobay v. Allied Signal, 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.
N.J. 1991)("In order to preclude recovery of response costs [under CERCLAJ, there must be
a clear provision which allocates these risks to one of the parties ... [Tihe agreement must at
least mention that one party is assuming environmental-type liabilities,"); Southland Corp. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1987)(must be an express
provision which allocates risks). But cf. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454
(9th Cir. 1986)(held liable for response costs because both parties were aware of potential
incurrence).
150. T & E, 123 N.J. at 402, 587 A.2d at 1264-65. It is not clear why the buyer's
indemnity to the seller "will surely alter the equities in respect of any claim of benefit-of-thebargain damages by a successor in the chain." Id. If the seller's "innocence" concerning the
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indemnity from the seller's immediate vendee may not even protect
the seller from the latter's claim for what was unknown by both parties at the time title was conveyed. A buyer cannot be held to a
waiver or release of damages from an unknown abnormally dangerous condition. "[S]trict liability may be avoided only by a knowing
agreement to accept the risk of an abnormally hazardous activity
.
. 9-151 It is boilerplate contract law that waiver requires a knowing relinquishment of a known right. 152 Such a knowing relinquishment was not possible in the T & E situation.
T & E's "all or nothing" holding, which places the entire burden for the unpredictable tailings disaster on the unwitting seller, is
difficult to reconcile with an earlier decision by the same court.1 53
There, the New Jersey Supreme Court held'1 4 that "in a true postECRA transaction, . . . a buyer should not be limited to the rescission remedy" if the seller conveyed in violation of.its ECRA responsibilities to clean up pollutants on the land.' 5 5 The buyer may sue for
damages.' 5 ' However, in Dixon Venture, the contract of purchase
had been executed before ECRA and, therefore, the seller was unaware of any ECRA obligations.' 5 These unique circumstances required tailoring the remedy to equitably reflect "the parties' common
understanding.' ' 5 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that
the seller and buyer, in their economic bargaining, did not build the
cost of ECRA clean up into the purchase price because the seller
could not know of ECRA's requirements. "9 The case was remanded
so that the trial court could fashion a "remedy that should be in
accordance with the economic realities of the situation," the
equivalent of the CERCLA law apportionment rule discussed
abnormally dangerous situation does not protect him, a contractual provision will not always
serve the purpose intended by the T & E court. It is doubtful that the "innocent" seller, one
who truly does not have any knowledge concerning any dangers on his property, by definition
is concerned enough to ask the buyer for an indemnity. Otherwise, every seller will have to
seek an indemnity from every buyer to be certain that the seller will be protected in the future.
151. Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 711 F. Supp. 784, 804
(D.N.J. 1989)(holding that an "as is"contract for the sale of property was insufficient to
signify a release).
152. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (1990).
153. Dixon Venture, 235 N.J..Super. 105, 561 A.2d 663.
154. Dixon Venture, 122 N.J. at 234, 584 A.2d at 800.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 230, 584 A.2d at 798.
158. Id. at 234, 584 A.2d at 800.
159. Id.
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above. 160 It is illogical to deny a similar, more equitable allocation of
damages when dealing with unforseen consequences and damages for
which U.S. Radium was held strictly liable under common law.10 1
Warnings about the chaos the T & E result portends for the
real estate market appear justified. Sellers of commercial real estate
will never know where they stand as against third parties who may
not even exist when they part with title to their properties. The dividing line that T & E has drawn unfairly shifts the entire economic
burden onto the one party who innocently and unknowingly caused
the harm. The legislative approach, which fairly and equitably allocates responsibility according to the equities in each case and which
limits recompense to necessary "response" costs, provides a better,
more realistic remedy.

160. Dixon Venture, 122 N.J. at 232, 584 A.2d at 799.
161. The main distinction might very well be the New Jersey Supreme Court's contention that U.S. Radium was well aware of the damages from radium. However, Dixon Venture.
admittedly knew how it had polluted the ground. 122 N.J. at 230, 584 A.2d at 798. It did not
foresee that, under ECRA, it was responsible for its cleanup and hoped that caveat emptor
would relieve it of liability in the absence of any contractual responsibility. U.S. Radium,
when it sold, was aware of neither the dangerous nature of the tailings nor any statutory nor
common law responsibility for the tailings.

